jerboa-fuse

Experimental FUSE filesystem bindings, memory-backed filesystems, and encrypted-vault helpers for Jerboa.

The repository contains Jerboa modules for building FUSE filesystems, an in-memory test filesystem, secure-memory helpers, access-control helpers, vault-oriented examples, and a small native mount helper.

Status

Private/experimental Lane C. Do not treat this repository as production-ready until the filesystem threat model, deployment hardening policy, FFI boundary documentation, vault recovery behavior, and native dependency review are complete.

The current code is intended for local development and review. It is not ready for unattended mounts, privileged deployment, or use with irreplaceable data.

Build

make build

The build compiles src/mount_helper.c, which owns FUSE mount calls, secure memory helpers, blockstore file I/O, and OpenSSL-backed vault crypto wrappers.

Test

make test
make audit
make security
make sbom
make openssl-advisory-check
make reproducibility-report
make target-evidence
make release-evidence

make test runs memfs, secure-memory, access-controller, and vault tests. It does not perform a real FUSE mount in CI; mount smoke tests require an explicit Linux/FreeBSD host with FUSE configured.

make release-evidence records the local release artifact bundle under dist/release-evidence/, including toolchain identity, native linkage, an SBOM/platform-support bundle, deployment privilege policy markers, an OpenSSL advisory gate, source inputs, hashes, and a two-clean-build reproducibility report. Production candidates must link a patched OpenSSL line: 4.0.1+, 3.6.3+, 3.5.7+, 3.4.6+, or 3.0.21+.

Production support is blocked until make target-evidence records marker- complete target mount, vault corruption/recovery, and service-sandbox proof files through JERBOA_FUSE_TARGET_MOUNT_PROOF_FILE, JERBOA_FUSE_TARGET_CORRUPTION_PROOF_FILE, and JERBOA_FUSE_TARGET_SANDBOX_PROOF_FILE, or equivalent release-host evidence is attached. Proof files must not contain vault contents, passphrases, keys, private paths, hostnames, raw mount output, or raw command output.

Security

Filesystem code can expose or corrupt local data if path, mount, permission, or lifecycle handling is wrong. Review SECURITY.md, docs/threat-model.md, docs/deployment-hardening.md, docs/ffi-boundary.md, and docs/release-evidence.md before using it outside tests.